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ABSTRACT 
Models in macroeconomic sciences are designed with the aim of understanding and then 
simulating the real world economic and monetary policy making. There has been a considerable 
debate over how to model the real world economic phenomena, and how correctly those models 
allow explanations of general equilibrium; that is, whether the models with their assumed 
parameters are able to expound on critical aspects of monetary policy making. Some models are 
structured to provide naïve explanations of the monetary policy process, while others are higher 
order complex models that attempt to elucidate the dynamicity of economic equilibrium. 
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model is one of such a complex model which 
has found the flavour of the time following its rapid adoption by Central Banks around the world. 
But strong contentions rebate the usefulness and question its effectiveness over other standard 
tools of macroeconomic and monetary policymaking process. Many scholars debate that DSGE 
models are far from perfect, to render it efficient in public policy making, although its adoption 
has been one such phenomenal. This paper aims to discuss in some detail about such debates 
relating to the contentious issues which arose on account of the failure of DSGE models to 
effectively detect the recent financial crisis the subprime of 2008. Hence, the present study 
revolves around a formal analysis of the epistemology of econometric modeling involving complex 
dynamic systems in real world policy making, and discusses whether if new models like DSGE 
could in fact help explain general equilibrium, or if they fail, then what to look for in their failure.  
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1. Introduction 
Dynamic General Stochastic Equilibrium (DGSE) simulations succeeded other applied 
general equilibrium models as an instituted model during its inception in the 1990’s. It 
was developed as a policy making tool with an eye toward efficient decision-making by 
the Central Banks who readily endorsed the model during the late 1990’s. Similar in 
structure with respect to the first generation RBC models which was a fusion between 
growth and business cycle theory (See Kydland & Prescott 1982), and which 
incorporated shocks and frictions (Galí & Rabanal 2005), DSGE models are not entirely 
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different, and yet they have definite microeconomic foundations. DSGE models rose into 
prominence following their adoption by the European Central Bank, and by many other 
central banks around the world having developed their own versions of these models 
(Tovar 2008). Stochastic models of general equilibrium those related strictly to the 
DSGE framework although does not rigorously constitute the core forecasting 
approaches adopted by the central banks as yet, nevertheless, they are applied for formal 
policy analysis and tools for forecasting and predicting the impact of policy changes. 
Most macroeconomic models are designed with the aim to stabilize the real economy 
(price stability), and keep inflation under control. Models are systematic representations 
of reality, or rather, instruments to simulate and understand the nature of real world 
workings. Although the debate about which models to adopt and whether to adopt any 
policymaking instruments if at all to influence the economy, is though an old question, 
the new question as if at present which is still unresolved is, perhaps, whether if there is 
a general positive consensus about the use of monetary policy instruments to stabilize 
the economy (following the resurgence of New Keynesianism). The distinction in 
thoughts regarding the role of monetary policy in economic stability is a long-run 
problem itself, with division of opinions among the “monetarists” and the “Keynesians”. 
Monetarists did not see price control or other means of non-monetary interventions to 
tackle inflation as a viable model to stabilize the markets2, whilst, the Keynesians 
believed that public policies (fiscal) do modulate aggregate demand and have bearings 
on inflation and output. During the 1950’s-60’s, the problem seemed twofold−should 
money supply be moderated? Should money demand be modulated? These old debates 
have now been replaced by new thoughts following the adoption of rational expectations 
theory and then the Real Business Cycles. The role of monetary policy in fact does 
matter, as the theory of monetary neutrality was disputed by Romer & Romer (1989) and 
which furthermore established the role played by Federal Reserve Bank in setting 
monetary policy goals or responding to declining output and employment (Mankiw 
2012). Nevertheless, short-run non-neutrality of money has been established by several 
studies which yet again confirmed the validation of classic studies on monetary policies 
by Friedman & Schwartz (1963). It appears though that following past several ones while 
facing up to the present financial crisis, there is little if any doubt about such an accord. 
As Milton Friedman (1968) expounded on the issues about the wider agreements which 
existed regarding the major roles that economic policies or rather monetary policy 
should play, Friedman wrote― 
“There is wide agreement about the major goals of economic policy: high 
employment, stable prices, and rapid growth………There is least agreement 
about the role that various instruments of policy can and should play in 
achieving the several goals.” 
                                                                                                                            --- Friedman (1968) 
  How true in fact, how much realistic it is that there is little if any disagreement about 
the role which economic policies are supposed to play in the economy; i.e., to sustain 
high employment, fuel growth and maintain price stability3. But what Friedman had 
perhaps meant by his latter statement, can be reduced so as to mean that― there exists 
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divergence of opinion and discord about the role of policy instruments which are 
adopted by policy makers toward achieving those goals. In effect, the above statements 
do confirm the implicit interrelationships between at least the three macroeconomic 
variables; (a) employment, (b) price (inflation) and (c) growth. And then, the 
extrapolative one― that is, how monetary policy can in fact contribute toward such 
stability in order to achieve the major goals in economics (as enumerated above), and in 
what way should it be conducted in order to render it beneficial. Undeniably, it is now 
evident that stability is the most fundamental goal of all economic policies and to realize 
these objectives, policy makers require efficient tools and frameworks to achieve 
“stability” in price. Most central banks conduct their monetary policy toward stabilizing 
the economy, or forecast and extrapolate any future “instabilities”. However, unlike 
other central banks, the modern European Central Bank (ECB) do not have a strict 
inflation targeting guideline to follow, but they have a flexible inflation targeting 
framework in practice wherein the primary objective of the bank is to oversee price 
stability in a monetary union(Weber 2012). This is relevant with respect to the Central 
Banks’ adopting stochastic dynamic models to understand general equilibrium(or 
stability), and that the rationality behind the ECB having adopted the DSGE framework 
for their core policy analysis is, for the reason― to forecast unexpected shocks and to 
understand the evolving behaviour of the economy as a whole. Hence, DSGE approaches 
refer to holistic approaches in dealing with economic instability. But, there in fact, are 
some mounting issues and challenges surrounding the use of these models by the central 
banks (Tovar 2008). There also persist problematic matters related to the fact that how 
correctly DSGE models can allow explanations of the general equilibrium? As there still 
remain lack of consensus regarding the use and applicability of DSGE models for 
macroeconomic policy making, this paper attempts to underline the raucous debate over 
use and adoption of unorthodox models deemed to be imperfect for macro-policy 
analysis (Faust 2012). Before one should attempt to address the core issues and 
problems entangling the global economy, one must be able to, in such regard as it is 
hence when pertinent, to address issues and challenges concerning how to approach 
such problems entangling equilibrium matters in macroeconomic dynamics; what 
specific models, tools and techniques should be adopted to deal with such problems? 
Equilibrium models of business cycle have been one of the primary issues of 
considerable debate among scholars and policy makers. The explanations sought by 
them to explain the unexplainable causes of fluctuations in real output not attributable 
to the available factors of production (Lucas 1975) have led experts to seek for causes 
which they assumed must be those involving random shocks to the economy. Hence, the 
current discussion revolves much around the rationalization of models which would 
enable our understanding of economic (business) fluctuations (instabilities) to the fullest 
extent. 
  This paper henceforth, seeks to discern the real equilibrium conditions of the economy 
for instance; what is the foundation of economic equilibrium which demands such 
models? Following this, the paper moves on to the discussion about the legitimate 
conditions for a model that is likely aimed to deal with such equilibrium issues in 
monetary policy making employing dynamic models which are stochastic in nature. 
Stochastic models are employed to study and analyze economic fluctuations in discrete 
time series. Finally, the analysis attempts to shed some light on the aspects of modeling 
innovative models and what to look for in such models when they fail. In essence, what 
does models generally tells us? And then, how to interpret the results derived from such? 
In the following sections, the discussion begins with a short discourse about agent 
expectations and behaviour and how they could affect market price. Following this, the 
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paper attempts to address the core issues of this analysis which are― dealing with 
complex data, the concerns regarding model design, their usefulness and their 
implications. Thus, the debate revolves around the general theme of this paper which is 
related to such contentious issues regarding the validation of adoption of DSGE models 
as means of tools for policy analysis and practice. 
2. Rational Expectations & Price Theory 
The assumption of rationality in economics is itself by far the most speculative theory in 
practice since it is hard to assume that all agents are always rational. Although some 
assumptions about agent behavior are necessary in order to construct a dynamic 
stochastic model, ultimately, the goal is to draw concrete conclusions from the data 
analyzed and then compare how reasonable the model is with respect to the real 
economic system. The material theme for argument regarding Classical models and 
Keynesian models originate from the old debate about the nature and behaviour of 
prices, and so forth, from the behaviour and expectations of real agents. Classical 
macroeconomic theorists consider that prices were flexible, whilst Keynesian theory 
centers on the concept that prices are sticky, non-flexible and agents require to intervene 
to equilibrate prices. What the agents might expect in the long run is that− how much 
they are informed about the future (the power of prediction and forecasting), since, 
expectations are nothing but informed predictions of future events (Muth 1961). A little 
more precisely, the point is to determine how far they are rational, which means; how 
much their predictions about the future outcome can go right or wrong. Herein, the point 
of contention lies between the subjective probability distribution of outcomes and 
objective probability distribution of outcomes; the subjective being referred to as− 
‘expectations’ while the objective is about the predictive power from reasoning and 
analysis, or say, of models (technical competence of a model). In similar import, these 
models attempt to study the nature of adaptive expectations (Nerlove 1958) of agents 
who hold expectations about the future value of their labor, capital and assets, while at 
the same time they tend to adapt according to the available information and the 
environment; in effect, they are assumed to be rational. Agents tend to maximize their 
expected utility, while at the same time; they assume some degree of uncertainty 
associated with the outcomes of their decision-making process when such decisions are 
made under risky or tentative situations. Most assumptions can be modeled on risk-
neutral or risk-seeking individuals who assume variable degrees of risk, and base their 
expectations on increasing marginal utility, but what about those risk-averse individuals 
who generally assume intertemporal constant utility? How to model individual choice, 
preferences and future actions of individuals who are (mostly) risk-averse? Which is 
easier to model? Naturally, a generalization of all economic agents’ utility maximization 
effort is necessary with the view that on average, most individuals are rational and would 
make rational decisions (which in practice is not so). Generalizations about how people’s 
expectations about the future might determine or influence business cycle hence is the 
primary goal of DSGE models which also takes into account the rational expectations 
theory.  They also have future expectations of outcomes that nevertheless aim to 
maximize their own expected future utility. Equally factual it is that, those expectations 
about the future scenarios do motivate present behaviour and actions (Gertchev 2007).  
In some respect, DSGE models attempt to simulate how expectations may evolve over 
time. But in practice, do they really? Forecasting involves modeling of future 
expectations. There is a definite relationship between formation of prices and formation 
of expectations. Expectations have an effect on the formation of prices although 
expectations may be random and there is variable degree of uncertainty associated with 
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human expectations. When assumptions about the future expectations in “price” 
development appear to be unreasonably founded, agents tend to adapt on account of 
errors in expectations (Gertchev 2007); they try to be more rational. Agents adapt; and 
they learn to be rational. However, if they repeat their mistakes time and again, they are 
irrational agents. Therefore, it is unlikely that one would simply discount errors in 
future if one suffered from such in the past. Errors in judgment, choices and decision-
making help agents to learn from those and adapt as they might be. This nevertheless, is 
also the fundamental basis of the theory of rational expectations. The theory of rational 
expectations therefore has become the standard model in orthodox economics. However, 
this hypothesis−the formation of expectations is criticized by Gertchev (2007) who 
contend that expectations fail to exert influence upon economic phenomena. This is 
partly a mistaken assumption to which I lend my slender disagreement. Expectations do 
affect economic phenomena; i.e., firms use information about volume expectations to 
adjust to production schedules (Hill & Jones 2004). Recall that Muth (1961) has also 
called expectations ‘rational’, and rational they are in that sense―that they are on 
average precise, but may go wrong. The probability that they might go wrong is the one 
of the foundational basis of rational expectations theory. In public policy management, 
policy makers aim to formulate novel models to simulate and forecast future (evolving) 
agent behaviour, actions and expectations based on their present assumptions about 
future expectations. That is, how expectations might change, and what could bring about 
those changes in agents’ future expectations? Expected changes in price movements 
although may be to a certain extent non-deterministic, but informed forecasting may 
make a difference. Insofar, forecasting models deals with uncertainty, expectations 
formation and (price) prediction. Central banks employ forecasting tools which help 
them to model future trends in inflation, demand and consumption. Most central banks 
respond to inflation to stabilize the economy, whereas in response to inflation, they 
target price (CPI based targeting policies). The models they adopt for their monetary 
policy process are generally grounded on the principles of welfare function through 
policy interventions. They employ traditional models for short-term forecasting which do 
not include assumptions about agent preferences. Central Banks in their business of 
inflation targeting (Bernanke & Mishkin 1997) to stabilize the economy tend to keep an 
eye on the unemployment level as well. Monetary policy intervention, or more so, the 
demand-side intervention even in free market economies should not be taken up as 
lightly as any lack of it which might worsen any prevailing unemployment levels. Sitting 
back and doing nothing except watch away the economy plunge into doldrums is 
contemptible than to undertake some sort of policy interventions to contain a crisis. This 
reminds us of about the Great Depression when the US economy was in acute crisis 
characterized by unusually high unemployment rate and highly depressed income levels 
(Mankiw 2006). Government interventions guided by Keynesian macroeconomic 
policies helped revive the economy and saved capitalism from collapse. When we faced 
another similar economic crisis during the summer of 2008, in magnitude not less than 
that of the previous one, for the economists, is was even a bigger challenge, for since, the 
present economy is highly leveraged and financial markets are weakly regulated (Solow 
2010). And it was again New Keynesian macroeconomics which was called for action to 
help stabilize the economy. In lieu of Keynesian economics, public policy hence is the 
cornerstone of effective governance; aka management of national resources, inflation 
and output.  
 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  However, the growing interest in new Keynesian macroeconomics following the 
financial crisis of 2008 has led to opposing views on the renewed interest in government 
policy interventions following Federal Reserve’s active monetary policy mediations to 
contain the subprime crisis. Some authors criticize that this renewed interests in New 
Keynesian macroeconomics is extraneous; the New Keynesian models do not fit enough 
to be useful for policy analysis (Chari, Kehoe & McGrattan 2000). Nevertheless, Policy 
makers are in search for effective tools and policy models which invariably emphasize 
the importance of equilibrium in the economy, as well as, to forecast accurately, any 
stochastic deviations from it (disequilibrium). 
   In the realms of macroeconomic domain, thus, models play an important role in 
monetary policy advice and outcomes. Models help forecast output growth, inflation 
trends and fluctuations in aggregate demand. In effect, central banks’ inflation target 
follows Taylor type rules to set interest (policy) rates in the long run. The upshot is that, 
the New Keynesian macroeconomics favour government policy interventions to oversee 
stability and manage unemployment rate to boost aggregate demand when there occur 
shocks to the economy. New Keynesian DSGE models herein find favour since they 
employ nominal frictions to mark-up wage and price stickiness, and among other 
variables, the model applies unexpected shocks which drive movements in output, 
investment, consumption, hours worked, wages, and unemployment to examine the 
impact of sudden monetary shocks to the economy. The interactions between real 
output, aggregate demand, real wage and price (inflation-indexed to Consumer Prices) is 
of prime importance since, changes in inflation horizon and output growth would be 
reflected on the costs faced by firms and also on the households which adjusts to the new 
settings. This also pertains to the Phillips curve which signifies the relationship between 
inflation and unemployment―decrease in unemployment rate increases inflation; which 
simply means that, deflation is bad for the economy. However, Phillips curve failed to 
explain for the persistence of high inflation and concurrent prevalence of high 
unemployment rate, a phenomenon called stagflation. In similar tune, following the 
Subprime crisis, there prevailed a more dreadful environment characterized by a 
persistent low inflation and high unemployment rate in the US, which actually 
corroborates Phillips curve yet again.  
             Fig. 1 Macroeconomic Variables 
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If we search for a derivative from the Phillips curve, we may assume the wage “fixed” as a 
continuous parameter since, any expected increase in real wages may reduce further 
employment and job creation wherein firms may suspend hiring enough if wage increase 
is above optimal. In essence, there is no limit on the question of how much a firm should 
profit, whilst, there is a definite cap on the price of labour; hence, there will never be a 
perfect equilibrium in the market economies and therefore, every unique equilibrium 
point is considered as a new equilibrium in itself. This is a paradox, and which perhaps 
induces wage stickiness. And this is also imaginably the principal involuntary “gap” in so 
called the market economies (rather a drawback) wherein, a concurrent appreciation in 
value of goods and services is frivolously recompensed by a measured change in real 
exchange by a concurrent increase in real wages. This effect nevertheless, depresses 
future consumption and the dampening effect is rarely acknowledged. However, the 
adjustments do indeed occur after a fixed interval in a forward looking manner (Plosser, 
2012); still, there arise stickiness in adjustments, which means that― real wages and 
price adjustments become rigid(Lawrence, Eichebaum & Evans, 2005) even though a 
new equilibrium is attained (See nominal rigidities and the effects of dynamic shocks). 
3. How much Complex a model should be? 
Why a model needs to be complex? A simple answer to this question is likely, to model 
complexity. It is important to draw attention regarding the nature of complexity that a 
model is expected to deal with. Modern economic systems are compositely dynamic, and 
in a market economy, agents make decisions with differential preferences. Hence, it is 
relevant that those agents get an environment which is balanced, whereby is it assumed 
that agents make rational decisions. This was the foundational basis of rational 
expectations theory, conceived during the 1960’s. Decisions are generally microfounded 
on the assumptions of human rationality (Tversky & Kahneman 1981), since business 
organizations make rational decisions (Simon 1978) which are based on rational 
assumptions about the economy and such assumptions mandate that rational choices 
                     Fig. 2 The Phillips Curve 
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should be consistent and coherent. Although agents might have limited choices for policy 
actions in decision-making, even then, not all agents make similar choices under every 
given conditions. Some agents do make irrational decisions. Nevertheless, agents― in 
order to maximize their rewards, often assume variable degrees of risk. The assumption 
of risk is an important concept in economics and finance where agents seek superior 
rewards as an outcome of their decision-making process based on choices. Decision 
problems involve choices and options. Prediction of people’s choices in an uncertain 
environment is a difficult task which is a complex decision problem (Tversky & 
Kahneman 1981). The complexity of the choice process, as investigated by Schilirò (2011) 
who likewise, contends that agents who are not perfectly rational and neither have 
perfect information may chose suboptimal options (wrong choice) which is also an 
example of the models of preferences wherein agents may commit mistakes while 
choosing. I reverberate on similar grounds that models of preferences with imperfect 
information about the future may perform poorly given that it is rather difficult to model 
“exactly” how agents’ preferences would change over time.  Actions of agents based on 
choices and given options may differ, which might lead to different kinds of reward 
functions (Chatterjee, 2011) and discrete equilibriums (optimal or suboptimal 
equilibriums). The difference between optimal and suboptimal equilibrium is a deviation 
which help determine the discordances of individual preferences. Models which include 
these measurable aspects of human preferences, intertemporal choice, and decision-
making beyond the given data on which to draw conclusions are invariably complex 
since it must be assumed that preferences change or adjust with time. Traditionally, this 
means that decision-making is a dynamic issue, and for all this, we need dynamic models 
which would likely take into account the changing preferences of agents over time. 
Preferences change as much as expectations which do change as well. Expectations are 
based on prospects; i.e., how much informed is one’s viewpoint about the future which is 
uncertain? How much is the deviation in agent’s viewpoint from others’ about the future 
prospect of a similar event?  And it is here where the importance of the formation of 
expectations is realized. Traditional macroeconomic models attempt to predict 
deviations from equilibrium points in near future given some immediate and past 
information about correlation between macro-variables about what is actually produced, 
in order to forecast future production, consumption and demand. Hence, economic 
activities are path dependent process which is a property of complex dynamical systems 
(David (2000), Chatterjee (2011)). Initially, the Classical Libertarian models did not 
include explicit agent preferences in their modelling which is an important aspect of 
advanced macroeconomic agent-based models. However, the Classical (Austrian) School 
of Economics those championed by Carl Menger (1871) and Walrus (See Walrassian 
Equilibrium)during the late nineteenth century did actually define and took into 
consideration the individual subjective preferences since they considered it essential to 
include analysis of human economic actions on the basis of choices4. Since information 
about the future is imperfect, and to model uncertainty in production, demand and 
consumption processes, traditional models incorporate some degree of probability. 
However, it is not enough! Construction of accurate models requires incorporating the 
expected future changes in agents’ preferences. This is still not enough as well!! Since, 
consumer preferences are unpredictable to certain degrees―they change over time. To 
keep in mind, it is very unlikely that one would be able to foresee all possible outcomes 
using general equilibrium modelling, or any modelling to speak. Hence, it is easy to 
invalidate predictions based on just past observations, but difficult to forecast future 
path of “unique” equilibrium points, or deviations from them. Modern economies are 
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complex dynamical systems, owing to the growing nature of complexity of its 
agents―and so are complex their preferences, choices, behaviour and tastes. To include 
all these aspects in a model, it would invariably make the model a highly complex 
surrogate of the real economy. But how much naïve or complex a model has to be in 
order to explain real world economic events (Krugman, 2000)? What should be the 
nature of complexity of a model to explain real world monetary policymaking? In other 
sense, there should be clear specifications regarding the nature of models which could 
reasonably be employed in macroeconomic analysis (Woodford 2008). Taking on 
Mankiw’s (2006) criticism about the failure of macroeconomists in designing models 
which could have been meaningful for central banks to conduct their monetary policies 
effectively, Woodford (2008) argues that such modelling efforts are evolutionary in 
nature. Meaning that― they were employed on trial and error basis but the results were 
not as favourable as one might have expected to be. Insofar, macroeconomic models are 
complex simulations of the real world economic events. Macroeconomic models may be 
complex yet they might not serve the purpose, while they may be simple enough to 
render them useful in monetary policymaking process. In essence, the aims and scopes 
of macroeconomic models are not just restricted to public policy making, but beyond 
this, they are usually designed as essential tools to help explain general equilibrium, or 
lack of it (disequilibrium dynamics). Fundamentally, dynamic and general equilibrium 
issues make matters worse for the monetary policymakers. Yet, the solitary objectives of 
the central banks are tangible, however, to draw practical conclusions from studies on 
general equilibrium for welfare analysis. Central bankers rely on tools and techniques to 
frame monetary policies to contain inflation.  To be precise, hence, it is not that much 
important whether if a model is a complex or a simple one, as regard to its actual 
efficiency to help explain the real world events (Krugman 2000). But it is imperative to 
render such models useful to study and explain delicate processes which characterize the 
actual workings of an economic system.  
4. Short-term vis-à-vis Long Term Forecasting Models 
Models in macroeconomic sciences spans across a wide array of functionalities based on 
diverse requirements that are meant to serve  wide-ranging functionalities― i.e., for 
forecasting macroeconomic trends, business cycle fluctuations, predicting variability in 
output and understanding dynamic behaviour of economic systems in the short run and 
in the long run. It is important to posit that models which are exclusively developed for 
monetary and public policy making may not be equally effective in dealing with 
forecasting short-term or long term “market trends”; for which, a simple reduced form 
forecasting model or Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) based-technique, or other 
quantitative non-linear dynamics and analytical techniques may render more beneficial. 
The choice of equations to define a function also depends on the nature of data to be 
analyzed; how models can best fit into the data? For instance, a first order polynomial is 
a straight line as simple as a regression line, while, more complex quadratic second order 
or third order cubic equations are employed to fit in more complex data.  
  Macroeconomic models are meant to forecast overall fluctuations in aggregate demand 
and output, to model expected real inflation and frictions in business cycle. Besides, 
macromodels are used to explain long term trends in economic growth. This however, 
does not exclude the fact that they ignore the financial markets, since, stochastic 
dynamic models may be equally effective in forecasting financial market trends, and the 
only difference which differentiates such approaches is about the adoption of specific 
variables and parameters explicit for market analysis. In the above example in equation 
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1, if we include several market variables and parameters and then fit the model into the 
data, we get a curve fitting around the dispersed data. Financial market models generally 
include technical market data as (dependent and independent) variables i.e., the stock or 
index quotes; for instance, open, low, high, and close (all these actually constitute the 
“price signals”); and then, volume, market cap, book value etc., whereas macro models 
more often concentrate on macrodata or macro-variables (i.e., real GDP, inflation, 
unemployment rate, Federal Funds Rate etc.).      
5. In Search of Equilibrium: Aggregate Demand & Aggregate Supply 
Equilibrium Models: From Classical, through Keynesian, over New Classical into DSGE 
toward New Keynesian models 
In market economies, agents have preferences―what they want. This modulates the 
technological preferences in turn―what can they produce? In simple terms, the 
interaction between (wants) aggregate demand and (production) aggregate supply 
determine the behaviour of “prices” and modulate actual levels of output. Output is the 
national income―while the balance between aggregate demand and aggregate supply 
which imply equilibrium level. Like demand and supply, prices of goods vary over 
time―meaning that, they are dynamic. The problem is to determine the price which 
constitutes equilibrium, since assuming transactions do not occur at disequilibrium 
prices where goods do not clear the markets (Zeimer & White 1982), market forces then 
attempts to eliminate most of the inefficiencies which characterize such disequilibrium. 
Disequilibrium is a state when the economy is not in equilibrium―where market prices 
have not adjusted fully. The proof of the existence of equilibrium denotes that at some 
point of time, the economy is at some unique point on account of adjustments in 
production, demand and consumption. This again means that, at market price, goods 
clear the markets more efficiently than they would have cleared away under 
disequilibrium states, since buyers and sellers are reluctant to trade at disequilibrium 
prices. These “unique” points may be captured from historical analysis of all the possible 
variables which makes up a real economy dynamic. The two variables―inflation and 
unemployment, constitutes among the most important economic factors which also pose 
as complex problem to every economy. The tricky part is not just to identify such unique 
equilibrium (Morris & Shin 2001) points but also to establish the fact that equilibrium 
exists in general where, aggregate demand equals short run aggregate supply (SRAS), 
with optimum inflation horizon, optimum unemployment rate (full employment) and 
price stability. This seems to be a simple enough representation of an economy in 
equilibrium but when considered through the lens of new classical economics as opposed 
to Keynesian, new classical economists claim that the economy will move towards its 
long run equilibrium extemporaneously; and without any intervention given an increase 
in demand which would affect the price only, but not output. Which means that in the 
short run, when demand increases, the cost of production (cost of factor input) increases 
as well which raise price to a new level, but since the economy is at full employment, 
firms compete for scarce resources and hence cut back production that brings down 
output to the previous level, while the price remains unchanged at a higher price level 
(price do not fall with respect to fall in output). This once more implies that, new (price) 
equilibrium has been reached. At this point, the economy is at the level of output which 
is more than the full employment level. This comparison between the new equilibrium 
position and the old equilibrium position is termed as comparative static. So, at each and 
every new instance of the above phenomenon, different but new price equilibrium is 
reached. A similar but analogous situation occurs when the aggregate demand falls. 
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While in the Keynesian view, aggregate demand can increase up to a certain level with an 
increase in output, but without any increase in “price” level. For any increase in 
aggregate demand above that level, the effect would be purely inflationary.  
Now, what should be the real purpose of a macroeconomic model―forecasting or for 
policy making? From classical macroeconomic thoughts to the recent New Keynesian 
paradigm, the shift has been one such resounding. For any inquisitive learner of 
economics, I would need to ask myself―what economics has taught me―and how such 
‘transitional’ knowledge could be best transformed into understanding about how the 
economy functionally evolves, and then, to apply them into a functional model to 
forecast and assume how economic policies are modulated, to what extent, and in what 
manners to suit the needs of the times. And to understand this “shift” in paradigm, one 
would require understanding what changes were effective during the transition from the 
classical to the neoclassical synthesis―those corresponding to adoption, criticism and 
then abandonment of the old philosophies to adopt new theories in macroeconomic 
policy modelling. Macromodels which evolved during the last few decades (1950-2000) 
have implied more roles for government policy interventions, stressed on the availability 
of household-level and firm-level data (Kocherlakota 2007). New models came into 
existence during the 1980’s which were capable of fitting into enormous amounts of data 
generated from the industry, household and governments. These were microfounded 
macroeconomic models of Neoclassical synthesis and New-Keynesian Real Business 
Cycle theories which were followed by general equilibrium stochastic dynamics models 
(SDGE). These models were supposed to explain fluctuations in output cycles which are 
affected by technological shocks, shocks to productivity and consumption and demand 
shocks.  
6.  Modelling Models: Dealing with Complexity 
Economic systems are complex for the very reason that human behaviour is complex, 
and as a system, we are imperfectly understood by ourselves. Complexity arises out of 
interaction between multiple agents, agents who are themselves complex.  True it is that 
our brain is an amazing machine of reasoning and deduction, but the reality seems to 
point to the fact that there are data and information which are a lot too complex for an 
average functional brain to handle or deduce just by the power of observation and 
analysis alone―data too big to handle for the brain. For the reason that we have found 
“ways” to develop “means” in order to handle and analyse such complex data which are 
often too big, and we have every reason to develop tools and “systems” that are capable 
of handling as well, examine data to seek patterns hitherto beyond our given natural 
powers of observation. In simple sense, models are “systems” modelled to solve specific 
problems. We may call such a problem solving system a “representative―agent” of the 
actual world― which makes it possible to build theories in order to explain what the data 
might tell us, where the data might lead us to, or, how to find solutions in order to 
resolve inherent and evolving problems of the economic systems. Computational models 
are composed of systems of algorithms which are designed for specific purposes. A 
model may consist in its kernel algorithms which contain prompts, conditions and 
effects that may be looped according to the requirements of the model, with a goal to 
obtain the final effect. The conditions may be formulas, methods and procedures which 
attribute towards the overall behaviour of the model. A predictive model relies on data 
gathered from observations of natural phenomena―say, data about consumption trends 
and income levels of a population. Factual it is that any “prediction” is based on post-
habits and may be non-reflexive; hence, historical data and present information are 
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required to forecast the future. Representative models designed to mimic human agents 
would require formulations of equations that would exactly define the behaviour of the 
target agents, and the art of designing formulas and algorithms constitute the functional 
aspects of a model―which constitute as a prerequisite, to build functions to enable it to 
behave as required. This is the most difficult part of modeling. Nonetheless, Howitt et., 
al.,(2008) argue that it is time to go beyond such representative agent models, including 
DSGE’s, while they advocate that the science of macro should focus more on 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
heterogeneous agent macro models which takes into account preferences, interactions 
and endogenous learning diligently. This means that, models should have the capacity to 
learn how expectations “emerge” and change with time, how agents interact among 
themselves, and whether if such interactions leads to optimal reward functions. In such 
parlance, De Grauwe (2010) previously stressed the need for the model to take into 
account the limited cognitive abilities of agents. This relates to fitting in ad-hoc 
assumptions about agents’ cognitive abilities for which the model can introduce 
“rationality” through trial-and error based learning. Incorporating a learning component 
within the structure of DSGE models would go far way to model how preferences and 
expectations might change over time.   The architecture of such structural models hence 
should be “goal oriented”―meaning that, they should be able to predict the changes in 
agents’ choices’ over time. They should tell more stories and provide “clues” about the 
future path of those agents’ actions and preferences. But this is nevertheless, a difficult 
task for model builders. In any case, our expectations about the practical usefulness of 
models grow as the economy evolves. However, every well-designed model tells some 
stories. Actually, it is the data which have stories to tell since it contains all the vital and 
essential matters of importance, while different models may tell different stories from 
the same data. A simple model with fewer variables might fail to identify essential 
hidden patterns. Therefore, selection of variables depends on identification issues. And 
this is what the DSGE models face; identification issues (Canova & Sala 2005).  
 
             Fig. 3 Revival of DSGE (SDGE) Models 
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  To all intents and purposes, models serve as an artificial vision to a human observer, 
since they help enhance the capacity to detect what natural observations might have 
overlooked. Human beings have a limited capacity for perception, observation and 
analysis; it is practically impossible for a human mind to analyze all the information 
which they perceive all at the same time since. Human agents are rationally bounded 
(Simon 2000) and have cognitive limitations; hence, there is a limit as to how much 
information agents can actually process. Mechanistic models generally amplify the 
capacity to deal with enormous amounts of data generated by economic processes. The 
science of pushing the threshold of model simulation to their extreme limits have its own 
limitations as well, but that threshold is increasing by time in order to detect what other 
models overlook which is also the reason behind design and development of innovative 
and analytic tools.  New models give substitute older ones, and have different structural 
aspects which deal with new parameters. The models and analytical tools of 
experimental macroeconomics having definite microfoundations are developed with an 
aim to aid in public policy making, understanding human choice and decision-making. 
While those instruments employed by Central Banks in their monetary policy process 
deals with both cardinal and terminal information to examine aggregate quantities. But 
as critics would say, or impose “impractical demands” which are often beyond the scope 
of average models to effectively deal with the real world scenario, I would like to ask, are 
most macroeconomic models far from being perfect? Which is “the most perfect” model 
that could sufficiently capture the time-series properties of macrodata? According to 
Gurkaynak, Kisacikoglu & Rossi (2013), the authors state that most of the existing 
methods are not the finest and the best; that is, it is difficult to single out the most 
“optimal” forecasting model since their relative accuracies evolve over time. To capture 
real dynamicity, a model should be dynamic enough to include all the changes in discrete 
time series. Viewed from another angle, the goodness of a predictive model can be 
judged by how accurately it is able to forecast future trends which are dynamic. Models 
are by far abstract approximations of the reality; they include certain degree of 
abstraction in order to render them efficient. But this problem is rather non-trivial; is it 
possible to elaborate and capture all the real world events within a single model? If one 
would consider this to be the case, then every macroeconomic model, irrespective of its 
popularity, would fall prey to Lucas Critique at some point of time or other. However, 
with the exception that forecasting models, if designed with ingenuity with an eye that 
such models are immutable from structural changes due to policy shifts, systematic 
errors in forecasting could be avoided.  Since it was Lucas (1976) who raised this issue 
and according to his critique, reduced form models may be useful for forecasting while at 
the same time, may perform poorly in econometric policy analysis and evaluation. 
Whereas, models specifically designed for policy advice may not perform commendably 
in forecasting trends. Citing Lucas (1976) from his seminal paper who argued that―  
“…the features which lead to success in the short-term forecasting are unrelated to 
quantitative policy evaluation, that the major econometric models are (well) 
designed to perform the former task only, and that simulations using these models 
can, in principle, provide no useful information as to the actual consequences of 
alternative economic policies.” 
                                                                                                                             ---- Lucas (1976) 
  This particular issue has been the topic of major debate (See Lubik & Surico 2006) 
regarding the validation of forecasting models wherein scholars agree to the point that 
short-term forecasting models may not prove useful in long run policy making. That 
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is―short-term forecasting models can hardly be beneficial to be effective to correctly 
predict the long-term outcomes of alternative government policy changes, since, policy 
changes are no “one time” actions (Plosser 2012). The reason for this is that―agents tend 
to readjust their behaviour in response to policy changes. Agents can, in fact, alter their 
behaviour without any expectations for policy changes as well. They are in 
essence―unpredictable, but need not they be irrational. Policy regime changes, in some 
respects, are impulsive as well. Models should take into account alternative government 
policies to simulate any expected changes in policy implementations. In simple standing, 
models should include―what if scenarios. The reasons are simple enough. Human 
agents have behavioural heterogeneity; they assume the differential policy choices for 
their own consumption patterns and investments which may often be far from 
optimal―they could go either way―optimal, “suboptimal”, or, they can be “super-
optimal”―which means, they can turn out to be highly efficient. Consumption and 
investment decisions fluctuate over time though it is certain that humans must consume 
in order to survive. The question is, how much could be the fluctuations in real demand? 
Empirical validity of such models which include such agent heterogeneity and future 
welfare functions within their horizon may provide some stability to the models. In fact, 
parameter instability is often the cause of model failure (discussed in more detail in the 
ensuing section).  Indubitably, this reasoning is valid, and this was the very reason for 
the Lucas Critique to have become an objective test for model validation. 
Modeling shocks to Aggregate Quantities: 
  Aggregate quantities are price, employment, wages, goods, income and investment. 
Whilst DSGE models, besides including the historical GDP data, structurally model 
different types of real and nominal frictions to the economy; sticky nominal price and 
wage setting, habit formation in consumption, fixed costs in production and variable cost 
in capital utilization. To be noted, frictions slow down the adjustments and makes 
macroeconomic variables sticky―in essence, they appear to be constraints. Besides these 
frictions, the model also incorporates structured shocks to the economy which include; 
productivity shocks, demand shocks, mark-up shocks and monetary policy shocks (See 
Smets & Wouters 2003). The model assumes that these four categories of shocks are 
cyclical in nature and their recurrence or relapse would likely explain intertemporal 
booms and recessions. Although the reason for inclusion of these structural shocks may 
be a valid one, but to assume that the economy would be subjected to similar kinds of 
shocks on every instance is somewhat like saying we get a similar story each time when 
there is a recession.  Nevertheless, these models tell some stories, which Faust (2012) 
however, puts it in his own way― 
“At central banks, if you ask why one needs a structural model as opposed to 
simply needing a reduced-form forecasting model, one often gets the practical 
response that structural models are needed to help “tell a story” about what is 
going on.” 
Faust then goes on to say that― 
“Thus, when I apply Solow’s smell test, I conclude that I am beginning to smell a 
rat. And it smells pretty good—at least relative to that fruit fly odor we had been 
living with. ” 
  While Faust reverberates about Solow’s Smell test in a different manner, he considers 
that the smell of rat is “good”. By this, perhaps he means that he smells something 
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“suspicious”. Does it mean that he actually agrees with Solow? What this could mean is 
perhaps, he calls for a further review of the DSGE models to seek if there might be 
something worthwhile in it after all. The author draws an analogy with toxicologists to 
explain how macroeconomic models should adopt wet-lab practice (at least for peer 
assessments). While a thorough approximation of the procedures which are adopted by 
wet-lab toxicologists when they perform toxicity testing on animals to assess the 
minimum-maximum levels of human exposures to toxins could bring matters into light, 
toxicologists apply human-equivalent model―rat models per se, since rats’ and humans 
exhibit remarkable analogy (Faust 2012). The reason for this is that―rats and humans 
share many biological characteristics. In this respect, I would offer to draw examples of 
standard protocols of how pharmacologists adopt dose-response and toxicity-efficacy 
analysis to evaluate a potential novel candidate drug. Before human trials, most of the 
effects of medications are evaluated on surrogate models of human−which are rats. In 
such a way that, a rat might be thought of as a proxy (substitute) for humans (though 
rats lack gall bladder), and, with some approximations, (See Faust (2012) for a more 
detailed account of his critic) just as DSGE models might likely serve as a substitute 
model for analysis of the real world policies, with some constraints, some limitations.  
  Coming back to the point, indeed, resulting interpretation of the data might “tell us 
stories”―for instance, that there are inefficiencies in the production process of a firm or 
wasteful operation and execution of decisions. But to keep in mind that there may be 
other microeconomic sources of inefficiencies in the economy, and the reason that these 
new theories which claim they have microeconomic foundations do find favour over the 
more archetypical ones which the critics of classical macroeconomics consider logical. 
Consider that “stickiness” of prices is one of such. So for a central bank, what should be 
their object of price stability efforts? Or, should central banks intervene in the foreign 
exchange markets, then why they should intervene and how? If economics is considered 
a scientific discipline, and since science is for reasoning, it is for the best of economists to 
seek their answers by ways and means of finest tools available for reasoning and 
deduction. Real world data are dynamic, and to develop models which would capture 
that dynamicity, the essential requirements are those subtle methods of entangling and 
disentangling such a system consisting of vast number variables and parameters that 
define real world events, and then to include by reasoning the most cogent ones which 
could help define a synthetic model of realism. It is not possible to include all the 
variables or parameters which makes up the real world events; neither is it feasible given 
the limited powers of observation and analysis of even the smartest of specialists. Rather, 
a coarse approximation calls for many such omissions of variables that are considered 
non-essential, and by inclusion of those conditions which are considered necessary but 
may not be “sufficient”. On this regard, I beg to differ a bit from Faust on the cogency of 
adoption of DSGE models as a tool for monetary policy process. And finally, what to 
account for and how to detect inefficiencies in these models when they go wrong? 
7. DSGE Models: What to look for about omissions in it? 
Dynamic stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)5 is one such micro-founded model 
developed by Smets and Wouters (2003) which was specifically designed to seek policy 
advice and explain the nature and complexity of general equilibrium in an economy. The 
model includes in its kernel, the capacity to exploit data and deduce information by 
balancing the matters of complexity―it uses limited number of variables and data while 
                                                 
5
 See a general discussion about DSGE models at Wikipedia: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dynamic_stochastic_general_equilibrium 
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incorporating structural shocks to the economy which the model considers necessary for 
econometric forecasting. In design and development, therefore, DSGE models differ 
from classical models which lacked micro-foundations, and yet they differ from reduced 
form forecasting models. Hence viewed as an alternative to traditional models of 
forecasting (Chari 2010), DSGE models aims to serve similar purpose, but with a 
different approach―to explain what the traditional models of macroeconomics were 
incapable of. Contentious issues have arisen thereof regarding the usefulness and 
applicability of this unconventional model, while several critics of DSGE models claim 
that it fails to capture real world economics efficiently (Mankiw 2006). Critics’ 
furthermore emphasize that DSGE models are flawed and far from being perfect (Solow 
2010); i.e., they are incapable to answer questions related to monetary policy issues for 
the reason that they are not capable to explain microeconomic behavior 
accurately(Solow(2010), Mankiw(2006), Buiter(2009)), while the failure of the model to 
detect and forecast the Financial crisis of 2007-08 (Kocherlakota 2010) also led to 
assumptions about the model’s power to effectively draw practical conclusions from 
historical data. Noah smith (2014)6 assumes that DSGE models failed the “market test” 
and remarked that they have if any useful purpose in macroeconomic predictions. Does 
it mean that all these experts put DSGE models to RIP? This is not true. What is true in 
fact is that, people criticize yet find usefulness of the DSGE models. Why every 
macroeconomic policy models should require “market test” even if they are rarely used 
by financial modellers? Financial market specialists generally employ statistical models 
which use market variables, and seldom model shocks and frictions for predictions. 
Assuming that shocks drive business cycle fluctuations, and which may infer valuable 
information about “troughs” and “peaks” in a trend, there is no way that these 
fluctuations could accurately mirror market trends which include different variables 
altogether. Nevertheless, such findings could be used as ‘signals’ or triggers by financial 
market specialists to screen out potential hunch.  This issue however remains highly 
contentious. Since its inception, DSGE models have gone under severe criticism to pass 
through so called Solow’s “Smell-tests” with experts pointing toward optimization and 
reformulation of these models (See Kocherlakota (2010), Chari (2010) & Galí (2011a,b)) 
to fit ‘new data’ which they considered as necessary. Furthermore, issues have cropped 
up regarding variable omissions and parameter approximations―the first generation 
stochastic dynamic equilibrium models did not include few essential variables and 
parameters which were later added on to the system. Thus came along the reformulation 
of the Smets-Wouters (2007) framework with the addition of unemployment rate as an 
additional observable variable (Galí, Smets & Wouters 2012). This was mandated for 
efficient forecasting of output gap and furthermore, to elucidate the fluctuations in 
unemployment cycles. Anyway, stochastic dynamic models are rarely adopted by 
financial modelers who find very little usage for their purpose to benefit from superior 
market returns (Smith 2014). In fact, stochastic models like these might have very little 
to contribute toward market forecasting; they may better be left to deal with 
macroeconomic data and variables. It is not the goal of a modeler to make her model 
“look” more attractive but to render it more efficient.  In fact, models can be important 
without being interesting, or seem attractive without having any utility at all. Models 
help seek out evidence which has been overlooked by natural observation, or facts which 
appears to be imperceptible. This is the reason why one should search for particulars; for 
instance, our subtle powers of reasoning can bring forth more facts than from mere 
generalizations. Indeed, inclusion of a large number of variables and parameters might 
make a model complex, if the complexity and enormity of the data demands so, but that 
                                                 
6
 http://noahpinionblog.blogspot.in/2014/01/the-most-damning-critique-of-dsge.html 
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does not signify that the model is perfect. It is important to gauge how a model exploits 
data and deduce conclusions, since models without a good theory and “sufficient” data 
are worthless, as Pesaran and Smith (1995) conclude that models which do not represent 
data or theory lacks the executive powers of reasoning, and are ineffective for any 
practical purposes―including forecasting and policymaking. Indeed, DSGE models 
incorporate far lesser number of macro variables―about seven of them(See Smets & 
Wouters 2007); and to compensate for such non-inclusions, they include frictions and 
structural shocks to the economy to reveal probable physical insights (policy advice). In 
essence, these models are advanced but unconventional; or rather say, Avant-garde. 
Estimation of structural shocks modelled in dynamic models (DSGE models) of 
macroeconomic policymaking reveal several interesting insights regarding the historical 
data. However, the methods they employ are generally procedures which are nonetheless 
concepts and schemas developed systematically in order to render the model fit the data, 
and then to validate whether if the data suits the model to enable it to explain what is 
required. So, one might ask―does DSGE models fit the data? Contrariwise, is the 
amount of data which this model employs sufficient enough to draw tangible 
conclusions? Or, whether if the conception (priors) in the methods employed are 
infallible and if the schemas developed are flawless.  Some authors even debate to the 
extent even if a model fits the data perfectly, it may produce worst results to policy 
problems than an imperfectly fitting model (Kocherlakota, 2006). It is here where the 
disagreements regarding the suitability of the (DSGE) models arise. Part of the problem 
is that―some authors have attempted to optimize the models farther past beyond with 
unrealistic assumptions to see if the model’s predictive power could be amplified. When 
a model is too close to be highly efficient in predicting the future correctly, it is likely to 
contain more parameters and variables for “optimization” purpose. This increases the 
nature of complexity of the model until the model becomes too much complex to handle 
and fails miserably. 
   What makes a model complex is also the inclusion of abstract assumptions about 
agents’ future actions and behaviors. While variations in assumptions may affect 
conclusions but such assumptions and conclusions should be realistic enough to be able 
to model future scenarios rationally. Traditional macroeconomic models generally 
employ a large amount of data and macro variables, and it is the art and science of 
modeling models which are assumed to be perfect not just to “deal” with such enormous 
amount of data, but essentially, to give some sense to, or extract meaning from 
data―even if such data appears to be disordered or random. Beyond this, models are 
based on theories which propose several assumptions as hypothesis to draw some 
conclusion, and the function of the model is to “prove” whether if such assumptions are 
true or false. The model does that by means of intrinsic analysis of the data, structured 
on core design of the model for the purpose― by proving or disproving hypotheses which 
are constructed in a form of a theory. Hence, it is relevant to assume what a model might 
tell us, and then validate how correctly it does so. For the same purpose it is essential to 
comprehend first what an economic equilibrium is, how economic systems exhibit 
equilibrium, and what if, if there are any problems inherent with dynamic general 
equilibrium issues itself. It would be logical then to assume what kind of a model would 
likely be able to represent the dynamicity of economic systems with an aim to simulate 
the equilibrium conditions of the real economy. Without stability in the model itself, it is 
rather fool heartening to seek for equilibrium analysis of the real economy that is so 
complex enough to weaken the very foundations of a model which might have been 
designed without ingenuity and imagination.    
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8. What to look for in Models when they fail? 
Models do fail and become useless when the purpose for which they were designed is not 
fulfilled. Models which are usefully employed for forecasting purposes may fail to predict 
future trends, or shifts in trends due to sudden imposed shocks and frictions. When they 
fail, the first and foremost thing to inspect is to seek out any flaws in assuming the 
correct parameter specifications. Repeated back testing with historical data to check the 
empirical power of prediction of the model is essential for smooth extrapolation. 
Inclusion of wrong variables might also contribute toward poor forecasting, or parameter 
instability might contribute toward wrong policy advice, as is in the case of DSGE 
models.  Lucas (1976) specified that models which perform well in forecasting may not 
be that much useful for econometric policy evaluation (See Hurtado (2013) while at the 
same time, DSGE models which in some respect include assumptions about policy 
regime changes with subsequent changes in agents’ preferences, they still fail to account 
for agent heterogeneity. When agents’ preferences change, it could result in parameter 
instability−which simply put, the model fails to account for response to policy shocks 
and hence the policy advice derived from the analysis may be inaccurate (Hurtado 2013). 
By disentangling DSGE models, it may be possible to trace how shocks are structured 
with what parameters, and whether there is a drift in parameters when sudden shocks 
are imposed on the model. It is also relevant to scrutinize what variables are included 
and how the coefficients are coupled with those variables. The estimated values should 
be closely observed for any drift in parameters employed in the model; which of these 
structural parameters shows instability when subjected to inspection −stickiness, 
discount factor, habit formation, elasticity, share of capital in production, fixed cost, 
Taylor rule inertia, response to inflation and output gaps, trends in growth in GDP and 
inflation, hours worked and various mark-up shocks and imposed frictions (stickiness) 
as included within a DSGE model (for more details, consult Smets & Wouters (2003), 
Hurtado(2013)). Following this, one might round up to find out about the causes behind 
parameter drifts. Some deep parameters may nevertheless, remain fixed (constant). 
Now, what is meant by parameter instability and drift? Why should parameter instability 
matter at all? Answers to these questions would likely emerge from the interaction of the 
model with the real world; while the real world is evolving, is the model capturing such 
evolving trends? And if so, then how such aspects should be reflected by the model? If 
those evolving aspects are not being captured by the model then that might lead to 
wrong interpretations or outright failure in forecasting trends. Recall that Woodford 
(2008) argued by saying that modeling aspects are evolutionary in nature. Thus, adding 
a “learning” component to the model would likely enable the system to capture, learn 
and train itself in order to effectively help in forecasting. This would also help to account 
for any evolving change in household preferences, consumption patterns or demand, 
policy changes, regime shifts, production cycle, technological innovations, 
environmental factors, or any other aspects which might induce real shocks to the 
economy. The constructive philosophy of models is based on the structural edifices 
which characterize the architecture of a functional model; whether they are reduced-
form models or stochastic equilibrium models. Moreover, it is equally important to 
include all those factors as parameters estimates to build a robust dynamic fit of the real 
world economics. For just as the knowledge of the human body in healthy state is 
essential to compare the same in a state of disease, knowledge of the real economy being 
modeled by a model is a pre-requisite to compare and understand the robustness of the 
economy and its lack in crises. Very few new models are capable to include all the 
essential parameters to render a model highly efficient, and very few models indeed 
match the complexity of the DSGE models which nevertheless, amplify the nature of 
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complexity the model has to deal with. Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models 
do include all these real parameters of the economy and yet, they failed to signal an 
impending market crisis. One may wonder, ‘What a Model’ it is then! 
  New models are always subjected to criticism and validation of results derived from 
reasoning and deduction often shows that there might be inherent limitations or flaws in 
their structural designs and execution. For instance, the failure of DSGE models to 
forecast the financial crisis has been ascribed to parameter instability subjected to the 
models’ failure to account for unanticipated and unexpected shocks to the economy, for 
which it was actually designed. During the 1970’s, policy makers relied on reduced form 
Phillips curve and structural VAR models to forecast inflation and output trends. This 
idea was central to the notion of “fixing” interest rate in response to inflation―going by 
so called the “Taylor rule”. Forecasting of inflation and output trends was then the norm 
to chart out the policy paths of future interest rate changes, and to “optimize” the 
economy in response to output and inflation. But soon, such models were subjected to 
Lucas criticism which questioned about the stability and efficiency of those models when 
they failed to account for unexpected shifts in policy implications in response to 
structural shocks to the new economy. The criteria for criticism have been rather simple; 
but the remedial measures seemed to be too farfetched.  
9. Conclusion 
Prediction of anything which is uncertain is difficult since forecasting deals with 
uncertainty, while stochastic equilibrium models are dynamic because decision-making 
is a dynamic path dependent process. Equilibrium herein refers to the stability and 
balance in the economy dominated by the forces of supply and demand. In this paper, I 
have taken the pleasure to explain what dynamic stochastic models are, and what they 
aim in reality. The real pain with any stochastic model is to gauge its accuracy−how far 
accurately they can predict future trends? The present analysis have drawn in the DSGE 
models which are on the line of fire and criticism about which I have discussed in some 
detail, and about the real need for such policy making instruments to oversee issues of 
stability and instability in a economy. To model fluctuations, a model must be flexible. 
The point is how far DSGE models are successful in successfully predicting real 
fluctuations in business cycles.  To this end, this research highlights current debates 
about the usefulness and expediency of fancy models whose vanity is often the cause of 
its own meekness. We do not need fancy models which fail to perform what they are 
designed for, but we may certainly look for reasons of failure if the model achieves some 
degree of success and if there are any related known issues for their malfunction which 
might be resolved to make it more robust. This paper−the first one of a series of three 
papers which I have endeavored to address critical issues regarding econometric model 
design, wherein I hope that I shall be able to present in subsequent papers; and in a 
more lucid manner, the core issues revolving DSGE models, and the soft and hard 
debates gyrating around such issues related to its failure or overall success.  
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